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Abstract—In this paper, three pricing scenarios are proposed 
to set the transaction cost of the inter-operators agreement in a 
multi-operator cooperative environment. An analysis, of the 
operators’ profits, is performed for these cooperation scenarios 
and different price sharing models are investigated for 
comparison. First, we describe the proposed pricing scenarios, 
the motivation behind and the points of evaluation for each 
scenario. Then, we present the hybrid decision algorithm for the 
selection of the access in a multi-operator wireless networks 
environment. Next, we present two business modelsmade for the 
simulation, in order to highlight how network conditions and 
operator’s strategy for service price may affect the profitability 
of the cooperation. Simulation results show that proposed pricing 
models guarantee profit gain for the cooperating operators, and 
are suitable in a multi-operator sharing environment. A best 
pricing scenario can be decided depending on the deployed 
capacity for sharing and the user’s service price settings. 
 
Keywords—Multi-operator sharing networks; cooperation; 
access selection; service pricing; transaction cost, cooperation 
awareness. 
I. INTRODUCTION  
The mobile broadband traffic is growing in a rapid 
manner, facing network operators with the challenge of 
expanding capacity and enhancing the Quality of Service 
(QoS) of their communication networks. In addition, operators 
are worried about the decrease of revenues especially from 
voice services, and they sense the need of new technical and 
network solutions that can generate new sources of revenues. 
Business solutions introduced in [1]show that mobile 
operators cooperate with other competitors and customers; 
some proposed partners can be providers of a non-telecom 
service like financial institutes, public transportation or third 
parties taking intermediary roles. Multi-operators cooperation 
in the form of open access and always best connected, has 
been proposed in a number of large research projects 
likeAmbient Networks[2], SPICE[3]… etc. and several types 
of cooperation between networks and business entities are 
made. The cooperation of wireless network operators in a 
sharing environment is also introduced in [3] as a cost 
effective network solution to expand capacity and improve 
operators’ profitability.  Indeed, many works has showed that 
in a heterogeneous wireless environment, operators’ 
cooperation is unavoidable and inter-operator agreements can 
bring benefits in terms of both network performance and 
operators’ revenues [5][6]. In addition, new mobile 
architecture arises in order to help operator upgrading their 
access networks, and enable network sharing in a Cloud Radio 
Access Network [7]. 
In our work, we consider a cooperative environment where 
wireless network operators share their access resources, to 
upgrade their networks’ capacity and improve performance in 
terms of clients’ rejection and QoS degradation. In such 
cooperative environment, when an operator is unable to satisfy 
his client, he gives him access to the service through another 
network operator, thus avoiding his rejection. Consequently, a 
selection decision is needed when more than one operator are 
available for cooperation. In addition, a transaction cost is to 
be set in order to guarantee QoS and achieve additional 
revenues thus, making cooperation more profitable. 
In the context of multiple operators, most of the recent 
works study the selection of access and service pricing using 
game theory as in [9][10]. In a previous work, we proposed a 
cost function for the selection decision in a multi-operators 
environment, and we showed the efficiency of our algorithm in 
[11] and how the operator can control the selection decision in 
[12]. 
In this paper, three new pricing scenarios are proposed as 
flat price scenarios for the inter-operator transaction cost. We 
perform a thorough analysis of these pricing scenarios and a 
comparison with price sharing scenarios. Moreover, the 
proposed scenarios for a flat transaction cost price presented 
better profitability comparing to price sharing models, in some 
operator cases of deployed capacity and service price settings.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II 
presents relevant existing work related to business models in a 
multi-operator environment. Section III describes the proposed 
pricing scenarios for the transaction cost in a sharing 
environment, andthedecision algorithm used for selectionis 
presented in section IV. The simulated business models are 
depicted in section V. Section VI shows the simulation results 
for the efficiency of the selection algorithm, and elaborates the 
results for the pricing scenarios profitability, in each business 
model. Finally, in section VII, a conclusion is made for the best 
pricing scenario in function of capacity and service price 
settings. 
II. BACKGROUNG AND RELATED WORKS 
Mobile operator cooperation is introduced in [1] as a 
networking solution to reduce networks cost and generates 
new type of revenues. The author focuses on cost saving 
strategies based on cooperation through network sharing, 
spectrum sharing and roaming, besides femtocell deployment. 
Investigations on the drivers of cooperation revealed that from 
cost perspective the incentive to share networks might be 
lower today since a large number of base station sites can be 
re-used and since the price of radio equipments has been 
reduced. But, entering to the mobile market and keeping a 
position in this market motivate mobile competitors to 
cooperate[13].  
When cooperation decision is made, the sharing partners 
have to agree on several aspects such as: how much of the 
network should be shared, how to share costs for investment 
and use of the network, how to make decision for network 
expansion, etc. Thus, a sharing agreement must be settled 
between different competitors in order to manage radio 
resources in such multi-operator, multi-access, wireless 
networks. In [14], authors describe the business models for 
shared networks, based on fragmented wireless access and 
service market. Two examples are presented, the first includes 
Mobile Network Operators (MNOs) that offer wide area 
wireless access to specialized service providers, and the 
second includes Local Service and Access Providers (LSAPs), 
interactingwith service providers and mobile operators via 
Inter-Connection Provider (ICP). In such a fragmented 
market, an LSAP may also provide services via other LSAPs 
or MNOs networks, and MNOs can also lease capacity from 
LSAPS, thus a cooperative environment can be envisaged. 
Moreover, authors propose that network selection is 
performed by either the service provider or an ICP to preserve 
competition and reduce transaction costs. This ICP will also 
maintain the Service Level Agreement between radio access 
providers and service providers. The concept of a third trusty 
party is adopted also in [5] for inter-operators joint resource 
management. Inter-operators agreements for network selection 
decision and users’ transaction cost are maintained and 
guaranteed by a meta-operator acting as a trading agent 
between cooperating operators.  
Authors propose in [5] a two-layer JRRM (Joint Radio 
Resource Management) strategy based on fuzzy neural 
methodology. Its objective is to provide the most appropriate 
RAT (Radio Access Technology). Then, authors assumed that 
the total revenue generated by the userp is shared between the 
two involved operators. Thisenables the service operator to 
getαp where0≤α≤1. The first model consists of an inter-
operator agreement where the service operator gets all revenue 
with α=1, this model is more beneficial for the operator that 
correctly estimates the infrastructure deployment. The second 
model consists to share revenue in function of the normalized 
load η of the service operator withα=η,this model is fair for 
the service operator. A second work of the authors [6]proposes 
an additional revenue sharing model based on the service 
quality experienced by the users in terms of churning rate of 
the home operator which is a function of its blocking 
probabilityPb, thus settingα=C(Pb) the user’s churning rate. 
Performance evaluation showed that this novel sharing model 
keeps a fairer behavior of both previously proposed business 
models. 
In this paper, we propose three new pricing models for the 
inter-operator transaction cost. The transaction of a user 
consists of transferring this user from his home operator (H-
op) which has contract with, to a new service operator (S-op). 
The latter sets the transaction cost Cs and the H-op will pay it. 
The global achieved profits are compared using these new 
models and the price sharing models, in order to conclude the 
best pricing scenario for an operator qualified as the cheapest 
operator or having the best capacity deployment. 
III. TRANSACTION COST PRICING 
The inter-operator financial agreement should determine 
how the user transaction cost Cs is set between cooperating 
operators. In this paper, we test the profitability of three new 
pricing scenarios, where S-opi sets Csi, by three different 
functions of the service price piasdescribed in the following (pi 
is the price paid by the client of the operator i).  
A. ScenarioS1: 
To prevent any loss of investment, a guest user (user 
coming from another operator)must generate the same revenue 
as from a client user. Thus, the transaction cost of a S-opi is 
set equal to the service price, thusCsi=pi.In this scenario, we 
intend to assess the following points: 
 
1. Profits improvement especially for operators with cheap 
service price sp. 
2. Benefit from cooperation of an operator with the most 
expensive service cost. 
3. Effect on the client acceptance especially for operators 
with the cheapest sp. 
B. Scenario S2:  
We may notice, in S1, that an operator having the cheapest 
service price will pay a high price for its client transfer and 
gain less from guest users. It could face losses when client 
transaction is frequent. Thus, in this scenario, we propose that 
Cs=maxi(spi)i=1,2,3… In this scenario, it is guaranteed that all 
available S-op offers set the same cost for H-op. Hence, we 
intend to test if: 
1. The cooperation still beneficial for operators even when it 
causes profit losses. 
2. The operator having the cheapest price is improving his 
profits. 
C. Scenario S3:  
To improve users’ acceptance, an operator may perform a 
high rate of user’s transaction, which causes a lot of charges in 
S2. Operators may find better to pay less and get less than pay 
more. Thus, S3 proposes a priceCs=mini(spi)i=1,2,3…The 
study of this scenario targets the possibility of achieving profit 
gain with a low service cost. 
D. Scenario pShare:  
With price sharing S-op takes a share from the user 
payment αp thus, H-op keeps(1-α)p, where α≥0. Depending on 
the value of α, different sub-scenarios can be envisaged: 
1) Scenario pShare1: In this model, α=1, i.e, S-op gets 
all the revenue from user transfer.  
2) Scenario pShare0: In this model, α=0, i.e, no charges 
are depicted for user exchange, and H-op gets all client’s 
payment.  
3) Scenario pShare-: In this model, α<1, i.e, additional 
revenues are guaranted for both H-p and S-op. Without loss of 
generality we show the results for α=0.25 and 0.6. 
IV. OPERATOR SELECTION DECISION 
In our previous work [11], we proposed a cost 
functionCFthatenables to select the operator having a score 
STat minimum distance of the user score Su, while maximizing 
the home operator transaction profit (p-Cs). Simple Additive 
Weighting SAW is used to calculate Su which combines the 
QoS requirements of the user application, and ST which 
combines corresponding QoS parameters delivered by the S-
op. Thus, the selected S-opi is the operator having the lowest 
CF, with: 
CFi=Wu*Su-STi|-Wop*(p-Csi)
Where,Wu and Wop are weighting coefficients that determine 
the degree of importance for the user satisfaction compared to 
profit satisfaction, respectively. Details concerning the cost 
function CF are provided in our previous work [11]. 
V. SIMULATED SYSTEM MODELS 
For the simulations, we consider two business models MI, 
and MII.  
A. MI-Capacity effect 
In model MI, we assume that all operators deliver the same 
QoS specifications for the mobile users and set the same 
service price sp1= sp2= sp3, then we consider different 
capacity for each operator. Setting the same service price for 
all operators reduces the simulations to S1 and pShare 
scenarios.  
B. MII-Service Price effect 
In model MII, we assume that all operators deliver the 
same QoS specifications, have the same capacity, but set 
different service prices sp. 
These business models are made for simulation, in order to 
reveal which pricing scenario is more profitable in function of 
the shared capacity and the service price. 
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS 
A. Simulation Setup 
We consider three cooperating operators;Op1, Op2and Op3 
as in Fig.1, The delivered parameters and the service prices for 
each operator are depicted in Table I, for each model MI and 
MII. 
Users arrive to the system sequentially and we model the 
arrival and departure of users as a Poisson Process with mean 
arrival interval 1/λ seconds. We perform simulation for 
different values taken from 1/λ= [6 4.8 4 3.43 3 2.67]. Once 
connected, the user will stay in the system for a service time 
assumed to follow an exponential distribution of mean 
1/μ=4min. The simulations are implemented in Matlab for 
duration of 1200 seconds each and repeated for 30 
experiments. 
TABLE I.  OPERATORS’ NETWORK PARAMETERS 
System 
model 
Operators’ Network Settings 
Capacity(Kb/s) 
[Op1,Op2,Op3] 
Service 
Price(units/Kbytes) 
QoS 
specifications 
[JM, DM,BERM] 
MI 
[11000, 9000, 
5000] 
sp=0.5 [10, 30, 10-5] 
MII 11000 
sp1=0.3, sp2=0.5 
and sp3=0.9 
[10, 30, 10-5] 
B. Selection Algorithm efficiency 
The efficiency of the selection algorithm is shown through 
the blocking rate improvement for each operator of the system 
(Op1, Op2, and Op3), and the profits achieved via 
cooperation. The comparison of performance in terms of 
blocking rate and profits is done for the scenarios S1, S2, S3 
and the case where there are no inter-operator agreements for 
cooperation. 
 
1) Blocking rates improvement  
Figures 2a, 2b and 2cshow how the cooperation between 
Op1, Op2, and Op3, respectively,could reduce the blocking 
rates especially for high number of system arrivals. The 
maximum number of admitted users for each operator is 
increased of more than 20%, inducing an increase of the user 
acceptance in the whole system up to 24% for a blocking 
probability of 2%. This translates the capacity gain achieved 
through cooperation. Note that this improvement is the same 
for the three inter-operator agreements S1, S2 and S3. 
 
2) Profits Improvement 
Figures 3a, 3b and 3c show the total profits achieved by 
Op1, Op2 and Op3, respectively. Operators could gain more 
revenues through cooperation; the user acceptance is 
improved and extra revenues are gained from guest users.  The 
proposed pricing scenarios guaranteed higher profits for all 
 
Fig.1.Multi-operator system model 
 
 
Op1 Op2 Op3 
CRRM 
Third Party 
RRM1 RRM2 RRM3 
T1 T2 T3 
cooperating operators. In addition, Fig. 3c shows that S1 is the 
best pricing scenario to adopt by Op3, which sets a high 
service price p. 
C. Pricing Scenarios Comparison 
1) Capacity based Comparison-Model MI: 
In model MI, operators differ in the deployed capacity for 
sharing Table I. Figures4a, 4b and 4c show the profit 
achievements for Op1, Op2 and Op3, respectively, with each 
pricing scenario in addition to the case where no inter-operator 
agreement is made (No cooperation scenario).  
First, note that S1, S2 and S3 produce the same profits as 
the pShare1 scenario, for all operators (p1=p2=p3). The 
proposed scenarios guarantee high profits for the operator 
deploying a high capacity. But, these scenarios do not improve 
the achieved profits for Op3, having the lowest capacity, and 
losses may occur at same number of system arrivals. The 
proposed pricing scenarioS1,retaining the same price for 
clients and cooperating operatorsCsi=pi,guaranteesthe highest 
transaction cost (0.5 units/Kbytes) for the S-op compared to 
the pShare scenarios (with α<1). Thus, as much the 
cooperating operator can serve guest users as much it gets 
profits. However, when the operator wants to improve its user 
acceptance with a lot of client transfer to another S-op, high 
charges have to be paid. In addition, with the pShare0 
scenario, where the H-op keeps all its client payment and S-op 
 
Fig. 2a.Op1’s  blocking rates improvement
 
Fig. 2b.Op2’s  blocking rates improvement
 
Fig. 2c. Op3’s blocking rates improvement 
 
Fig. 3a. Op1’s profit improvement
 
Fig. 3b. Op2’s profit improvement 
 
Fig. 3c.Op3’s profit improvement 
 
 
 
Fig. 4a. Op1’s achieved profit (with high capacity) 
 
Fig. 4b. Op2’s achieved profit (with moderate capacity)
 
Fig. 4c. Op3’s achieved profit (with low capacity) 
 
loses additional revenues from guest user. This scenario 
causes a lot of losses for Op1, at high system arrivals. In fact, 
at these rates, Op1 is serving a high number of guest users, 
without additional revenues that may recover charges or 
probable client payments. Thus, our proposed pricing 
scenarios guarantee the best profits for the operators having a 
good dimensioning for sharing. 
 
2) Service price based Comparison-Model MII: 
In model MII, operators differ in the service prices 
(sp1<sp2<sp3). We are interested to show the profit 
improvement for Op1 and Op3 setting the cheapest and the 
most expensive service price p, respectively. 
 Figure5a and 5b show the profits achieved by Op1and 
Op3, respectively, with the different pricing scenarios. Results 
show that with the proposed pricing scenarios S1, S2 and S3, 
Op3 could maximize its profits especially for high system 
arrivals, where other price sharing scenarios cause losses.  In 
fact, Op3 could achieve the highest profits with S1. For 
Op1,S2 and S3 could improve its profits via cooperation but 
not as much price sharing scenarios did. Scenario S1 causes 
losses for Op1, at high system arrivals, where this operator 
transfers its clients to more expensive operators, and served 
guests do not assure enough revenues to recover transaction 
cost. Hence, S1 is to be avoided by the operator setting the 
lowest service price.  
VII. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, three pricing scenarios are proposed for the 
transaction cost of the inter-operator agreement, in order to 
improve operators’ revenues through cooperation, in a multi-
operator environment. These scenarios are analyzed and 
compared togetherand with different price sharing scenarios.  
Simulation results, using our modified cost function for 
access selection decision, have shown that the establishment 
of inter-operator agreements brings benefits in terms of user 
acceptance and operators’ profits. The proposed scenario S1, 
that maintain the same price for clients and cooperating 
operators has been shown as the best financial agreement for 
the operators having a good dimensioning for shared capacity, 
and the operator setting the higher service price in the 
cooperating system. When S1caused losses for the operator 
setting the lowest service price in the system, other scenarios 
S2 and S3 could improve profits and make cooperation 
profitable. Future work will take advantage of game theory as 
a tool for operator selection and inter-operator service pricing. 
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